An equilibrium-displacement model is combined with econometric estimates of key model parameters to identify the impacts of Canada's dairy advertising programs on prices and quantity. Results suggest increased advertising of fluid milk enhances the farm value of milk but has minimal effect on government costs of the dairy price-support program. Owing to government intervention in the butter market, increased butter advertising has no effect on the farm value of milk, at least in the short run, but is highly effective at reducing government costs. Advertising is most effective, ceteris paribus, in markets where retail demand and wholesale supply for the specific dairy product are relatively price inelastic.
At the wholesale level, bottlers and manufactur-gram is binding in the sense that the government ers purchase the raw milk from the provincial milk price is above the market-clearing price. marketing boards and convert it into fluid milk and
The critical difference between the binding and manufactured products for sale to retailers. Whole-non-binding programs is that in the non-binding salers pay government-mandated higher prices for case no surpluses are generated, which means that milk destined to fluid uses than for milk used in advertising-induced increases in demand for the manufacturing. The prices they receive, in turn, affected dairy product can still influence farm are influenced by government policy through a price. For a market with a binding offer-to-pursystem of wholesale price and processing margin chase program, a surplus is generated that must be guarantees and by advertising-induced shifts in re-purchased by the government. In this case, advertail demand.
tising affects government purchases and not price At the retail level, consumers purchase milk and (unless the demand shift is large enough to render other dairy products from grocery stores, restau-the offer-to-purchase program non-binding at the rants, and other retail establishments. Retail de-support price). Because the offer-to-purchase promand is influenced by consumer income, the gram affects only the manufactured markets, the prices charged for the various dairy products, and fluid market is specified separately from the manindustry advertising. Based on demand and cost ufactured market. factors, retailers place orders with bottlers and manufacturers to maintain inventories at desired Fluid Market levels.
The price and quantity impacts of advertising in The behavioral equations defining the fluid market the vertical system depend on the magnitude of the are: advertising-induced shifts in the primary demand schedules, the slopes of the supply schedules at
(1) = D(PA) (retail demand) each level, the behavior of marketing margins, and (2) W = FP) (retail-wholesale cost pass-through, i.e., whether farmers absorb price linkage) all, none, or a portion of the advertising levy. The cost pass-through, which in general depends on the (3) = S(W) (wholesale supply) relative slopes of the supply and demand schedules (
(retail/wholesale for milk at the farm level (Chang and Kinnucan, ( (market-clearing) 1991b ), appears at each stage as a leftward shift in the supply schedule. The behavior of the market-where If is retail demand for fluid milk, P 1 is ing margins depends, inter alia, on the degree of retail price, A, is fluid milk advertising, WI is substitutability between the farm and non-farm in-wholesale fluid price, and Qs is wholesale fluid puts in the vertical system (Kinnucan and Forker, supply. In this formulation, the retail and wholep. 290). If the substitution elasticities between sale markets are linked by a price-transmission farm and non-farm inputs are zero (fixed propor-equation (equation (2)), which may be interpreted tions), advertising-induced shifts in retail demand as a quasi-reduced form of the implied retail supin general will have a greater effect on farm price ply and wholesale demand equations. than when the substitution elasticities are non-zero
Comparative statics of the fluid milk model can (variable proportions) (Wohlgenant, p. 646) .
be obtained by first expressing the model in logdifferential form:
The essence of the foregoing framework is the ad-(6) dlnWI = Td 1 dnPI vertising-induced shifts in retail demand and the ,7 d = E dlnW consequent effects on price at the farm level. The ( d farm-level price effect depends on government in-( d~ nQ = d~nQ' tervention. The critical intervention for the pur-( d d poses of this analysis is the government offer-topurchase program. Two cases need to be distinFor brevity, exogenous variables other than advertising and policy guished: the case in which the offer-to-purchase variables (e.g., support prices) are not specified in the structural equaprogram is nonbinding in the sense that the gov-tions defining initial equilibrium as these variables are held constant in eminent price is below the market-clearing price the simulations to be presented later. However, the omitted exogenous eminent price is below the market-clearing price variables do appear in the econometric models used to estimate the and the case in which the offer-to-purchase pro-structural model's parameters.
where dlnZ = dZ/Z refers to the percent change in markets affected by advertising, the model is spec-Z divided by 100, N 1 is the retail-level demand ified with these two markets in mind. The strucelasticity for fluid milk, B 1 is the advertising elas-tural equations are: ticity, TI is the elasticity of retail-wholesale price transmission, and El is the wholesale-level supply (12) Q2 = D 2 (P 2 ,A 2 ) (retail demand) elasticity. The percent change in retail price is ob-(13a) W 2 = F 2 (P 2 ) (price linkage tained by substituting (5)- (7) (10) indicates that wholesale price will Pg is the government offer-to-purchase price; Qs is increase in tandem with the retail price, with the wholesale supply; and GP is government purchases. transmission elasticity T, governing the extent to The model's structure is similar to the fluid marwhich advertising enhances wholesale price vis-a-ket, with the important difference that an effective vis the retail price, offer-to-program produces a surplus in the affected The effect of an increase in fluid milk advertis-wholesale market (equation (15b)), which must be ing on quantity is obtained by substituting (10) into removed by the government to sustain the offer-(7), which yields to-purchase price.
Wholesale supplies are assumed to respond to the reigning price, the higher of the government Equation (11) indicates that the quantity effect of price and the wholesale price. If the offer-toan increase in fluid milk advertising hinges on the purchase program is non-binding, the assumed disupply elasticity. If El = 1, equations (10) and rection of causation is from retail to wholesale (11) are equal and a given percentage increase in price (equation (13a)), as in the fluid market. If the advertising will have identical effects on wholesale program is binding, the direction of causation is price and quantity. If the supply elasticity is reversed, with the support price determining the greater than unity, the quantity effect will be larger retail price (equation (13b)). than the price effect; if the supply elasticity is less
The reduced-form for the manufacturing market than unity, the price effect will exceed the quantity model in the case of a non-binding program is effect.
derived in a parallel manner as was done for the Equations (9)-(11) constitute the reduced form fluid milk sub-model. In particular, expressing of the structural fluid milk model. Given estimates equations (12), (13a), (14) and (15a) in logof the requisite elasticities, the reduced form pro-differential form and making appropriate algebraic vides a basis for assessing the impact of a given substitutions, the following set of equations is obincrease in fluid milk advertising on consumers tained: and middlemen.
Manufacturing Market
As mentioned previously, the market for manufac-(
-2)]dinA. tured dairy products is influenced by a government offer-to-purchase program, which is implemented where B 2 , E 2 , T 2 , and N 2 are the manufactured at the wholesale level. This program is binding in dairy product advertising, wholesale supply, retailsome markets (e.g., butter), but not in others (e.g., wholesale price transmission, and retail demand cheese). Because butter and cheese are the primary elasticities, respectively. These equations are sim-
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(23) P 1 = M 2 max(W 2 Pg)] (price linkage to A binding offer-to-purchase program implies mfg. market) that advertising affects government purchases (or (24) X = X + X (farm-level inventory) and not price. The reduced form that market clearing) expresses this fact is obtained by replacing (13a) where is the blend price of milk, P is the with (13b) and (15a) with (15b) and repeating the industrial milk price, P is the fluid milk price steps indicated earlier for the non-binding case. (equal to P plus a government-determined preThis yields the alternative reduced form: mium), X is the quantity of milk used for fluid
purposes (equal to Q 1 ), X 2 is the quantity of milk
where X is a fixed conversion factor that indicates
Quantity of milk produced,
Comparing (19) and (20) with (16)- (18), it is ap-e n u t system parent that advertising no longer influences retail e f b p obined by or wholesale price when a market is effectively first substituting equations (22)- (24) into (21), and supported by a government purchase scheme. This taking logarithmic differential of the resulting is because an advertising-induced increase in de-equation, which, after some manipulation, yields mand simply reduces the quantity that the govern-(bearing in mind that dlnX = 0): ment needs to purchase to maintain the support price. As long as the support price is too high for dlnB = P PXPBdlnXi increases in advertising to eliminate the need for government removals, there is no need for produc-(25) tion to increase to satisfy the additional demand + (PX 2 /PBX)L 2 dlnW 2 . and hence price remains constant. Equations (19) where L and L are elasticities of wholesale-farm and (20) indicate that an increase in the support transmission for fluid and industrial milk price always reduces retail demand and increases p ly. Recognizing that changes in retail degovernment purchases for normal-sloping supply mand translate into equivalent changes in farmand demand schedules. Under the same assump-level demand, i.e., dlnX, = dlnQI, equations tions, and for a given support price level, an in-(10), (11) and (17) are now substituted into (25) to crease in advertising always increases retail de-obtain the reduced-form equation for blend price in mand and reduces government purchases in the terms of advertising: supported market.
Farm-Level
The government's financial exposure under the of- (26) dInAi + 112222 dlnA 2 fer-to-purchase program is reduced by placing a PBX(E 2 T 2 -N 2 ) quota on milk production at the farm level. In ad-Equation (26) indicates how an increase in retaildition, the government attempts to enhance farm level advertising is translated into changes in the income through a price-discrimination scheme farm price given fixed supply and advertising in whereby milk destined for the fluid market is the fluid market or a manufactured market with a priced higher than milk destined for the more non-binding offer-to-purchase program. Given hisprice-elastic manufacturing market. The producer torical dairy price-support policies, equation (26) receives a "blend price," which is a weighted av-is appropriate for fluid milk and cheese advertiserage of the fluid and industrial milk prices.
ing. For butter advertising, equations (19) and (20) Accordingly, the farm market is represented by are used in place of (26) to reflect the fact that due the following set of structural equations:
to a binding offer-to-purchase program in the butter market, advertising-induced increases in retail (21) PB = (XI/X)Pi (blend price) demand for butter affect government purchases + (X 2 /X)PII and not price.
(price linkage to Equation (26) provides an a priori basis for asfluid market)
sessing the relative impacts of fluid milk and (non-binding) manufactured dairy product advertising. response to increased advertising expenditures (e.g., Venkateswaran, Kinnucan, and Chang). In . . an extensive review of the econometric literature, occurs within 3 to 9 months of the advertisement.
Clarke (p. 355) found that ". . . 90 per cent of the For dairy markets, studies suggest that market recumulative effect of advertising on sales of ma-sponses to advertising linger for months rather than ture, frequently purchased, low-priced products years (e-, Ward and Dixon; Kaiser et al.) and may be sluggish, i.e., require up to four months for an increase in advertising to register as an in- tested for delays in market response to advertising and Schmitz). The elasticity estimate compares faand experimented with alternative lag specifica-vorably to Venkateswaren and Kinnucan's estitions. Carryover effects, where significant, were mates of 0.043-0.060 for fluid milk advertising in modeled using a lagged dependent variable speci-the Ontario market for a similar time period. fication. Cumulative advertising effects are acWholesale supply exhibits a seasonal pattern counted for in the simulation model via the long-that mimics demand and shows an increasing trend run advertising elasticity, which is obtained by di-over time. Increases in the price of industrial milk viding the short-run advertising elasticity by one reduces the supply of fluid milk. The estimated minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged de-own-price effect, however, is not significant. One pendent variable in the respective double-log interpretation of this result is that wholesale supply model. is perfectly elastic, reflecting the hypothesis that the fluid market is supplied on demand because Fluid Milk Estimates milk used for fluid purposes is priced higher than milk used for industrial purposes. This interpretaCoefficient estimates for the most part agree with a tion, however, is inconsistent with the results obpriori expectations (Table 2) . Fluid milk demand tained by Kaiser et al. for the U.S. market, which is price and income inelastic, seasonal, and is sub-operates under a similar price-support structure. ject to habit formation as indicated by the highly Kaiser et al. (p. 8) found wholesale supply to be significant lagged dependent variable. Advertising price inelastic, with a long-run elasticity estimate is significant in the third quarter following the ini-of 0.38. Apparently, collinearity or perhaps weaktial expenditure, and exhibits a long-run elasticity nesses in model specification precludes obtaining a of 0.030. The response delay, although lengthy, is reliable estimate of the supply elasticity. not inconsistent with other findings (e.g., Capps
The price-linkage equations indicate stickiness in the transmission of price changes between marThe wholesale supply of cheese is positively reket levels as evidenced by coefficients near unity lated to the wholesale price and negatively related for the lagged dependent variables. This is consis-to the price of industrial milk. The estimated owntent with a market structure dominated by large price coefficient is 1.09, which suggests that dairy cooperatives that exercise government-wholesale supply is price elastic. The lagged desanctioned monopoly power in fluid milk pricing. pendent variable is significant and has a coefficient close to unity, indicating relatively long lags in Cheese Market Estimates adjustment of supply to price. This is consistent with the oligopolistic market structure of cheese Retail cheese demand is price and income inelas-production in which a few dominant firms (e.g., tic, exhibits no seasonality or habit formation, and Kraft) set the pattern for retail pricing and promoshows a positive trend over time (Table 3) . This interpretation is consistent with the esmated generic advertising effects, whether considered alone or in combination with brand advertising, are either insignificant or exhibit a perverse, The inability to identify significant (and satisfactory) advertising effects .e., negative effects. Similar results were obtained for cheese is not peculiar to the Canadian market; USDA researchers ' A reviewer suggested that given oligopolistic firms and other monopoly elements (e.g., cooperatives and marketing boards) in dairy markets, a model that allows for imperfect competition (e.g., Suzuki et al.) 3 Experimentation with alternative lags produced no better results.
may be more appropriate than the competitive market-clearing model 
(-1.03) System R 2 = 0.09 Chi-square = 350.49 with 23 df aNumbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. bLagged value used in estimation. cDairy processing plant margins (DPPMICPI) used as a proxy. dLagged value used as an instrument. eNumber in brackets is the elasticity evaluated at data means.
timated coefficients in the price linkage equations, than logarithms.) That the butter market in Canada which show significant lags in price transmission is sluggish to respond to increases in butter adverthroughout the marketing channel. tising is consistent with Chang and Kinnucan's (1990) study based on an earlier time period, Butter Market Estimates which showed a six-quarter lag. Chang and Kinnucan's (1990) estimate of the butter advertising Butter demand is price inelastic and seasonal, ex-elasticity is 0.023. hibits a negative trend and income elasticity, and Wholesale supply shows a significant positive shows no habit formation. Generic advertising relationship with the support price of butter. The lagged two periods is significant, and shows an estimated own-price coefficient is 1.50, suggesting elasticity of 0.060 evaluated at mean data points. an elastic supply, a result consistent with the cor-(Due to the existence of zero values, the advertis-responding estimate for cheese. The lagged depening variable is specified in natural numbers rather dent variable is insignificant, which suggests butter producers respond rapidly to price changes. markets, the price-linkage equations indicate sig- nificant lags in price adjustments throughout the elasticity, owing to the insignificant estimate obmarketing channel. tained in our econometric model, was set equal to 0.38 and, alternatively, 1.00. The former value is based on Kaiser et al.'s estimate for the U.S. marSimulation ket; the latter value was selected to more nearly match the supply elasticity estimates obtained for Given the insignificance of cheese advertising, the cheese and butter markets. In cases where simulations of the structural model are restricted to price-transmission elasticities from the estimated the fluid milk and butter markets. Specifically, the equations represent wholesale-retail or farmestimated elasticities are inserted into the reduced wholesale linkages, the elasticities were inverted form (equations (9)- ( 11) and (26) for fluid milk to obtain the requisite retail-wholesale or wholeand equations (16)- (18) and (26) Simulations for the butter market were confor butter) and the model is simulated to determine ducted under two alternative scenarios: (i) the ofthe effects of isolated 10% increases in fluid milk fer-to-purchase program is binding (SP b > P" and and butter advertising on equilibrium prices, quan-(ii) the offer-to-purchase program is non-binding tity, government purchases, and farm revenues ( ) T lte assumption reflects the (producer surplus). more recent experience with respect to pricesupport policy in the Canadian dairy industry (Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee). In Parameterization addition, the simulations for fluid milk advertising include the indirect effects of increases in fluid The parameters used in the simulation exercise are milk demand on government costs of the pricegiven in Table 5 . (Although the cheese market is support program. Results vestment in fluid milk advertising ($11.4 million) vis-a-vis butter advertising ($6.2 million), the Results indicate that the relative impacts of in-marginal effect of an increase in fluid milk advercreased fluid milk and butter advertising depend tising on producer surplus is only slightly larger critically on the supply elasticities in the two mar-than the marginal effect of an increase in butter kets and whether the offer-to-purchase program is advertising ($5.90 for fluid milk vs. $5.59 for butbinding or non-binding (Table 6) . If the offer-to-ter). purchase program is non-binding and the wholeIf the supply elasticity for fluid milk is inelastic sale-level supply elasticity for fluid milk is unitary, (0.38) and the offer-to-purchase program for butter fluid milk advertising has smaller effects on retail is non-binding, the quantity impacts of increased price and quantity than butter advertising and milk advertising are still smaller than for increased larger effects on the blend price and producer sur-butter advertising, but the price impacts are magplus. (With fixed supply at the farm level, farm nified by a factor of two or more. In this case, revenue and producer surplus (quasi-rent) are iden-increases in fluid milk advertising are much more tical.) However, owing to the larger baseline in-profitable at the margin than equivalent percent increases in butter advertising (the simulated marginal rates of return are $12.65 for fluid milk vs. price effects, increases in butter advertising trans-
